The leadership of the Seventh-day Adventist church has embarked our denomination on a three-year odyssey in an effort to address a difficult set of problems. A symbol of one of the problems is that surveys have shown that a significant percentage of SDA scientists and theologians can no longer accept as valid various elements of our church's traditional understandings and teachings concerning the Genesis narratives dealing with Creation and Noah's flood.

The "Faith and Science" conversations and consultations, which began in August 2002 in Ogden, Utah, will continue for North American Division scientists, theologians, and church administrators at Glacier View, Colorado in August 2003. As this dialogue continues this year and concludes with an international conference in 2004, it might be helpful to examine how thoughtful scientists and theologians in other faith traditions have approached the general problem of the interface of science and religion. One of these thoughtful individuals is Ian Barbour, and he has written this book as a means of sharing his views on this topic.

Barbour obtained his B.A. at Swarthmore College (1943) and Ph.D from the University of Chicago (1949), both in physics. After spending time as a student at the Yale Divinity School, he was appointed to teach both physics and religion at Carleton College in Northfield, Minnesota, later becoming chair of the religion department. He is now the emeritus Bean Professor of Science, Technology, and Society at Carleton.

In this volume, Barbour employs a typology he introduced in his well received Religion in An Age of Science (1990) "as an aid to sorting out the great variety of ways in which people have related science and religion" (p. 1). Each chapter in Science Meets Religion uses this typology to organize his comments. The four ways are conflict, independence, dialogue, and integration. He focuses primarily on the Christian tradition, arguing that reflections on science have been far more extensive there than in any other historic faith tradition. He examines a wide range of data and theoretical constructions used in astronomy, quantum physics, evolutionary biology, genetics and neuroscience, as well as the views of a wide range of theologians and scientists to illustrate the usefulness of his fourfold typology in "sorting out" various approaches to the relationship of science and religion. He believes that "dialogue and integration are more promising ways to bring scientific and religious insights together than is a conflict or independence mode." (p. 179).

In conflict mode, science and religion are enemies. In Barbour's view, the conflict process is best exemplified in the biblical literalism of religious fundamentalists and in the metaphysical materialism and naturalism of activist scientists, especially when considering evolutionary biology. "Biblical literalists believe that the theory of evolution conflicts with religious faith. They have promoted a prescientific cosmology as if it were an essential part of religious faith" (p. 36). On the other hand, self-proclaimed atheistic scientists claim that scientific evidence for evolution is incompatible with any form of theism. "The two groups agree in asserting that a person cannot believe in both God and evolution" (p. 2). Barbour argues that in making this statement, metaphysical naturalists ignore the wide theological spectrum within contemporary Christianity: "naturalism (including materialism), pantheism, liberalism, neo-orthodoxy, traditionalism, conservatism, and biblical literalism (or fundamentalism)" (p. 11).

The historical cases which are most often cited as examples of the conflict mode is the trial of Galileo in 15th century and the debate over Darwin's theory of evolution in the 19th century. However, Barbour notes that while some 19th-century scientists and religious authorities did indeed hold that evolution and religious beliefs are incompatible, many in both groups did not. Barbour notes that in fact three issues were at stake at this time: challenges to Biblical literalism, human dignity, and the argument from design.

In an aside, Barbour argues that a product of biblical literalism, "creation science." is a "threat to both religious and scientific freedom" (p. 16). The efforts of lawyer Phillip Johnson and other supporters of the "intelligent design" or "irreducible complexity" movement such as Michael Behe have, Barbour argues, raised valid criticism of scientific materialism, but they proceed to attack evolutionary theory as itself inherently atheistic, a conclusion that Barbour rejects. He favorably quotes Pope John Paul II: "Science can purify religion from error and superstition; religion can purify science from idolatry and false absolutes."

In independence mode, science and religion are "strangers who can coexist as long as they keep a safe distance from each other." (p. 2). Many evangelical, conservative and neoorthodox Christians advocate this strategy. One version states that there is no conflict, because science and religion refer to different aspects of reality, use a different language system with distinctive rules, serve completely different functions, and ask contrasting questions. In this perspective, "science asks how things work and deals with objective facts; religion deals with values and ultimate meaning." This is the position taken by the National Academy of Sciences in dealing with creationism and by Stephen Jay Gould in his Rocks of Ages: Science and Religion in the Fullness of Life. Another version claims that these two kinds of inquiry offer complementary perspectives on the world. "Conflict arises only when religious people make scientific claims, or when scientists go beyond their areas of expertise to promote naturalistic philosophies." Both science and religion can be accepted if we keep them separated. Barbour believes that the independence mode is "a good starting point or first approximation" (p. 21). However, while conflict is avoided, the possibility of constructive dialogue and mutual enrichment would be ruled out. "A religious tradition is indeed a way of life and not a set of abstract ideas. But a way of life presupposes beliefs about the nature of reality and it cannot be sustained if those beliefs are no longer credible" (p. 37).

In dialogue mode, science and religion can compare their methods of acquiring knowledge about the world even as they acknowledge their differences in how they approach reality and their language of discourse. Dialogue is possible, for example, in developing models and using analogies in imaging what cannot be directly observed--e.g., God or a subatomic particle. Alternatively, dialogue can occur when science consciously raises a question that is known to be beyond its boundaries, e.g., why is the universe orderly and intelligible? Barbour quotes the comments of Catholic theologian David Tracy, who holds that religious questions arise at the horizons or "limit-situations" of human experience (p. 24). Also, concepts developed in a scientific mode are used as analogies for talking about God's relation to the world, e.g., where God can be conceived to be the determiner of the indeterminacies left open by quantum physics.

In integration mode, a systematic and extensive partnership between science and religion would occur. Natural theology, from Thomas Aquinas to Richard Swinburne, has sought in nature alone or by human reason alone a proof of the existence of God. Barbour agrees that natural theology has a great appeal in a world of religious pluralism. However, he suggests that "taken alone it can at best lead only to the God of deism" (p. 30). Some astronomers advancing the "Anthropic Principle" in cosmology have argued that the physical constants in the early universe appear to be fine-tuned "as if by design" to provide the necessary elements for life to develop at least in our part of the universe. Stephen Hawking is quoted to the effect that "the odds against a universe like ours emerging out of something like the Big Bang are enormous. I think there are clearly religious implications" (p. 58). Other authors develop what Barbour calls a more promising "theology of nature" by beginning with a given faith tradition and arguing that some of its beliefs should be reformulated in the light of scientifically based knowledge. For example, for Arthur Peacocke, the starting point of theological reflection is "past and present religious experience in an ongoing religious community. Religious beliefs are tested by community consensus and by the criteria of coherence, comprehensiveness, and fruitfulness" (p. 31).

Another theological proposal contained in his integration mode starts from an analysis of indeterminacy in quantum theory. This view argues that God is the ultimate determiner of the indeterminacies at the quantum level. Such a process can operate without violating natural process, since such mechanisms operate with only probabilities within a range of values rather than dictating exact values. To Barbour, the most promising candidate to provide a systematic synthesis is process philosophy, which was formulated under the influence of both scientific and religious ideas. In the thought of Alfred North Whitehead, as for evolutionary thinkers, nature is a dynamic web of interconnected events, characterized by novelty as well as order. For process theologians, God is the source of novelty and order. However, Barbour warns that there are dangers "if either scientific or religious ideas are distorted to fit a preconceived synthesis that claims to encompass all reality" (p. 37).

Barbour notes that others have offered different typologies. For example, Ted Peters proposed a more elaborate classification which splits Barbour's "Conflict" category into Scientism, Scientific Creationism, and Ecclesiastical Authoritarianism. Still others claim that the interactions vary too much among different historical periods and scientific disciplines to warrant our employing any general schematic arrangement. Barbour agrees that the relations between science and religion are complex, but he argues that each of his four basic types can be found in each century since the rise of modern science and in each of the sciences.

In a section dealing with the religious meaning of Creation, Barbour notes the neoorthodox position that the Bible should be taken seriously but not literally. While the Genesis narratives portray a short earth history, an earth-centered astronomy and a three-layer universe, Barbour states that it also makes three theological affirmations: "(1) the world is essentially good, orderly, and coherent, (2) the world is dependent on God, and (3) God is sovereign, free, transcendent, and characterized by purpose and will. These are characteristics of the world and God at every moment in time, not statements about events in the past" (p. 48).

In his conclusion, Barbour notes that "all models are limited and partial and none gives a complete or adequate picture of reality" Nevertheless, he offers his own views as to what approaches he finds most helpful in considering when science meets religion (p. 79-80):

"I find exciting new possibilities in the use of specific ideas in recent science to conceive of God as designer and sustainer of a self-organizing process and as communicator of information. I am sympathetic with the theme of God's self-limitation. I also admire the more systematic development of ideas of God as determiner of quantum indeterminacies and as top-down cause. Finally, I find the concepts of process philosophy particularly helpful, but I am aware that a single coherent set of philosophical categories may not do justice to the rich diversity of human experience . . . Only in worship can we acknowledge the mystery of God and the pretensions of any system of thought claiming to have mapped out God's ways."

These confessional statements should be considered seriously as offering appropriate models and suggestions that might be taken up by the contemporary Seventh-day Adventist faith community as it attempts to move beyond its fundamentalist past in explaining God's relationship to the created world.